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419 
PROTECTING THE DEMOCRATIC ROLE OF THE 
PRESS: A LEGAL SOLUTION TO FAKE NEWS 
INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to discuss the 2016 presidential election without including 
the impact of fake news 1  in the conversation, and most commentators 
deplore the effect of fake news’ proliferation across the internet on 
American politics and the public.2 These conversations have centered on the 
impact fake news had on the presidential election,3 as well as concerns that 
the general public is unable to identify fake news.4 There have even been 
more immediately dangerous consequences stemming from fake news, such 
as a gunman showing up to a D.C. pizzeria to liberate children he believed 
Hillary Clinton was holding hostage there based on a widely-circulated fake 
news article.5 Fake news has been shared widely on social media platforms, 
primarily Facebook, and these platforms’ failure to contain the spread of 
blatantly false articles has exacerbated these problems.6 
Fake news is a social problem threatening the public’s ability to trust 
legitimate press outlets7 and, ultimately, the ability of the press to serve its 
role in preserving our democracy.8 Many commentators so far have focused 
on social solutions to fake news, such as better education for citizens to 
recognize fake news online, to the exclusion of legal solutions.9 But the 
                                                 
1. Throughout this article, the term “fake news” refers to false political news stories posted to 
social media sites that the authors know are false and are specifically intended to mislead readers.  
2. See, e.g., Kurt Andersen, How America Lost Its Mind, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/how-america-lost-its-mind/534231/ [https://per 
ma.cc/CA5Q-ENPA]. 
3. Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 211, 212 (2017). 
4. See Michael Barthel, et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-
is-sowing-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/4XD2-NUQC]. 
5. See Joshua Gillin, How Pizzagate Went from Fake News to a Real Problem for a D.C. 
Business, POLITIFACT (Dec. 5, 2016, 5:23 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/ 
dec/05/how-pizzagate-went-fake-news-real-problem-dc-busin/ [https://perma.cc/5E57-R3CM].  
6. See, e.g., Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories 
Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:15 PM), https://www. 
buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-face 
book [https://perma.cc/2QUK-MVPH].  
7. Sabrina Tavernise, As Fake News Spreads Lies, More Readers Shrug at the Truth, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/us/fake-news-partisan-republican-demo 
crat.html.  
8. C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 349 (1998). 
9. See, e.g., STANFORD HISTORY EDUC. GRP., EVALUATING INFORMATION: THE CORNERSTONE 
OF CIVIC ONLINE REASONING 24 (2016) [https://perma.cc/355Y-SLVA] (recommending providing 
students with more instruction on how to determine whether social media content originates from a 
source with a clear political agenda). The researchers tested middle school, high school, and college 
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threat fake news poses to the role of a free press in sustaining our democracy 
necessitates a legal solution to the problem as well.10 Congress could curb 
the far-reaching problems of fake news by clarifying the intended 
implications of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)11 on 
defamation liability for internet distributors. 12  Applying a modified 
standard of common law distributor liability specifically targeted to address 
fake news to internet service providers (ISPs)13 and websites would hold 
social media websites like Facebook responsible for fake news that site 
administrators have been informed is defamatory. This would drastically 
reduce the oversharing and spreading of fake news.14 A modified standard 
of distributor liability would be the best legal solution to the problem of fake 
news because it merely applies a traditional area of tort law to a new 
technology. Additionally, it would not create ruinous liability for internet 
companies because most websites already implement similar monitoring 
requirements to comply with federal copyright law.15 
This Note will explain the function of the free press in preserving our 
society, how fake news threatens the press’s legitimacy, and why a legal 
solution is necessary to protect the press’s democratic role. It will then 
propose a legal solution to curb the spread of fake news. Part II will explain 
that there is a consensus among First Amendment theorists that the role of 
the free press in a democratic society is to inform the public, allowing them 
                                                 
students’ abilities to differentiate ads from news articles, recognize paid political advertising, and 
investigate the neutrality of a website publisher. Id. at 6. See also David O. Klein & Joshua R. 
Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET L. 1, 12 (2017) (noting the development of 
and advocacy for media literacy programs in New York and California). 
10. See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of 
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 588 (2001) (“Serious online 
defamation thus poses a significant threat to social welfare that requires appropriate legal rules for 
redress.”). 
11. Congress passed the Communications Decency Act in 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 
133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Relevant for this discussion is 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230, which immunizes “provider[s] and user[s] of an interactive computer service” from common law 
defamation publisher liability. See infra Part II. 
12. See Leonid Bershidsky, How to Force Facebook to Fix Its Fake News Problem, BLOOMBERG: 
VIEW (Oct. 16, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-16/how-to-force-
facebook-to-fix-its-fake-news-problem [https://perma.cc/75ZF-YXCM]. 
13. As explained by an opinion interpreting § 230,  
‘Internet service provider’ or ‘ISP’ is the term commonly used to describe a company that 
provides computer users access to the Internet. An ISP is a ‘provider’ of an interactive computer 
service within the meaning of section 230(c)(1) because the service provided is, in the language 
of section 230(f)(2), ‘a service or system that provides access to the Internet.’  
Grace v. eBay Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 197 (Cal. Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded, 99 
P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
14. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 6 (noting that in the final three months of the 2016 
presidential election, false election stories from hoax sites and hyper-partisan blogs had more shares, 
reactions, and comments than reliable news stories from traditional and credible media outlets). 
15. See infra Part III.B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/5
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to actively participate in elections and the governmental process.16 It will 
also explain how fake news undermines the informing function of the press 
by eroding the legitimacy and credibility of traditional, reliable news outlets, 
creating an uninformed public unable to participate effectively in our 
democracy.17 Part III will explain the history of defamation liability and the 
development and legal interpretation of the CDA, which eliminated 
common law distributor defamation liability for ISPs and social media 
websites.18 Part IV will outline how the immunization of websites from 
distributor defamation liability has created a legal environment in which it 
is impossible for the subjects of fake news to bring defamation lawsuits 
against distributors to stop the spread of blatantly false and potentially 
dangerous material about them.19 It will also explain how amending § 230 
of the CDA to reinstate common law distributor defamation liability on a 
modified basis would be a workable legal solution to the threat fake news 
poses.20  
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PRESS AND ITS EFFECT ON DEMOCRACY 
Before noting current policies contributing to the rise of fake news and 
identifying potential solutions to curb its proliferation, it is important to first 
analyze the threat fake news poses to our democracy in order to establish 
the necessity of such a legal solution. This section will describe the vital 
role a free press plays in sustaining a democratic government by informing 
the public and facilitating public participation necessary for self-
government. It will also explain why corruption of the public’s trust in the 
press by the spread of fake news impairs the structural function of the press 
in sustaining our democracy. 
A. The Democratic Function of a Free Press 
The Supreme Court has consistently stated that a free press is essential 
to the “heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the 
survival of liberty.”21 Defamation liability,22 on the other hand, is generally 
                                                 
16. See infra Part I.A. Though First Amendment scholars provide differing justifications of the 
necessity of the press in a democratic society, the goal of this Note is to demonstrate that fake news is 
undermining the function of the free press, regardless of the theory of the First Amendment in which 
that freedom is grounded.  
17. See infra Part I.B. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III.A. 
20. See infra Part III.B. 
21. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 383 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring). See also Associated 
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A free press is indispensable 
to the workings of our democratic society.”).  
22. See infra Part II.A for an explanation of the common law doctrine of defamation liability. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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considered to chill speech, making it inherently at odds with robust 
protections of First Amendment values. 23  Thus, any discussion of 
defamation liability implicates significant tensions between compensating 
defamation injuries—injuries to a person’s reputation 24 —and still 
protecting freedom of speech and press.25 But the problems created by fake 
news raise the question whether public officials could use defamation 
liability as more than a tool to protect their reputations.26 Ultimately, these 
defamation suits could also serve to protect the essential democratic role of 
a free press from public disenchantment with its credibility and reliability 
by punishing publishers and distributors of fake news.27 
The First Amendment’s Freedom of the Press Clause28 exists because of 
the press’s “crucial contribution to democracy and democratic 
legitimacy.”29 At the time of the nation’s founding, most Americans saw the 
Press Clause’s function as “a bulwark against governmental tyranny,” 
upholding “the individual right of every man to air his sentiments for all to 
consider.”30 In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, scholars, courts, and 
politicians have emphasized various roles the press plays, such as providing 
information to the public,31 serving as a forum for public comment and 
                                                 
23. Freiwald, supra note 10, at 583 (“The threat of costly litigation and liability for defamation 
casts a shadow over the expression of controversial content, however true it may be. Rules imposing 
liability on those who publish or otherwise disseminate the defamatory statements of third parties 
particularly risk inhibiting socially valuable discourse . . . .”). 
24. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The legitimate state interest 
underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by 
defamatory falsehood.”). 
25. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA. L. 
REV. 785, 796 (1979) (explaining that “[n]owhere is the importance of free speech greater or the 
potential injury to reputation more severe than in the context of the American press”).  
26. See, e.g., David Folkenflik, Behind Fox News’ Baseless Seth Rich Story: The Untold Tale, 
NPR: MORNING EDITION (Aug. 1, 2017, 7:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/01/540783715/law 
suit-alleges-fox-news-and-trump-supporter-created-fake-news-story (chronicling a lawsuit filed by a 
victim of a fake news story spread by Fox News). 
27. The Supreme Court has recognized that blatantly false statements have slim to no social value, 
and therefore First Amendment law should not be overly concerned about chilling effects on blatantly 
false speech. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring) 
(“Misinformation has no merit in itself; standing alone it is as antithetical to the purposes of the First 
Amendment as the calculated lie.”). 
28. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
29. Baker, supra note 8, at 388. 
30. Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 66 (2016) (quoting ROBERT 
W.T. MARTIN, THE FREE AND OPEN PRESS: THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC PRESS 
LIBERTY, 1640–1800, at 3–4 (2001)). 
31. See William T. Coleman, Jr., A Free Press: The Need to Ensure an Unfettered Check on 
Democratic Government Between Elections, 59 TUL. L. REV. 243 (1984). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/5
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criticism,32 presenting the values of society,33 and checking the power and 
corruption of the government.34 The Free Press Clause is closely intertwined 
and therefore often examined in conjunction with the Free Speech Clause.35 
Scholars have questioned if the Free Press Clause can be examined 
independently from the Free Speech Clause because of the limited work it 
actually does in protecting American journalists.36 Because the two ideas 
are so closely connected by courts and scholars, free press theory is heavily 
influenced by, and therefore often discussed almost synonymously with, 
general theories of free expression.37  
First Amendment freedom of expression doctrine traditionally rested on 
the idea that allowing all speech would help society hone in on truth, which 
would triumph over false ideas in the marketplace of ideas.38 This theory 
had significant influence over early and mid-twentieth century development 
of the Supreme Court’s freedom of expression jurisprudence.39 Modernly, 
however, scholars have detached free expression doctrine from the truth-
seeking justifications of the marketplace of ideas because the theory rests 
on unverifiable, and likely untrue, assumptions that truth will trump other 
factors in determining whether individuals will accept an idea as true.40 
                                                 
32. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“As private and 
public aggregations of power burgeon in size . . . there is obviously a continuing need for an independent 
press to disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion through reportage, investigation, and 
criticism . . . .”). 
33. THE COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL 
REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES, AND 
BOOKS 27 (Robert D. Leigh ed.,1947.). 
34. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 521, 538; Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of 
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 357 (2011) (“Indeed, we lionize the 
local newspaperman as a bulwark against local corruption.”). 
35. Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2437 (2014). 
36. Id. 
37. The clauses are not only closely related, but also work in tandem to protect press speakers 
vigilantly by providing strong protections to nonpress speakers even if they do not fall within the 
confined class of press speakers. See id. at 2442–43 (“The Speech and Press Clauses function differently, 
yet they also complement each other. The Speech Clause can work in tandem with the Press Clause 
precisely because nonpress speakers can fall back on the many protections the Speech Clause puts in 
place.”) (footnotes omitted). 
38. This idea is most famously drawn from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. Paul Horwitz, The 
First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 448 (2012). 
39. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend 
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”). 
40. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 15. 
If truth is not ascertainable or cannot be substantiated, the victory of truth in the marketplace is 
but an unprovable axiom. In order to be discoverable, however, truth must be an objective rather 
than a subjective, chosen concept. Consequently, socioeconomic status, experience, 
psychological propensities, and societal roles should not influence an individual’s concept of 
truth. If such factors do influence a listener’s perception of truth, the inevitable differences in 
these perspectives caused by the vastly differing experiences among individuals make 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Moreover, this theory incorrectly presumes that all citizens evaluate ideas 
rationally. In reality, the marketplace of ideas has not perpetuated true ideas 
and cast doubts on false ideas and therefore has not created a better-
informed society.41  
Justifications for First Amendment freedom of expression doctrine have 
shifted instead to arguments for increased democratic legitimacy through 
participation and decision-making,42 arguments for individual autonomy,43 
and arguments for self-expression.44 Scholars addressing justifications for 
the freedom of the press doctrine have focused specifically on the first two 
streams of argument.45 The democratic self-governance theory posits that 
free expression, and by extension a free press, increases democratic 
legitimacy by informing citizens and allowing them to make better, more 
accurate decisions in self-governing and checking their government.46 The 
individual autonomy theory, on the other hand, states that free expression 
and free press increase democratic legitimacy by allowing citizens to act as 
autonomous agents in seeking information through the press and applying 
it to their own self-governance. 47  Thus, the democratic self-governance 
theory is primarily consequentialist, while the individual autonomy theory 
values free expression as an essential component to democratic legitimacy 
in and of itself.48 
These two theories of the relationship between free expression and 
democracy result in differing justifications for why a free press creates 
democratic legitimacy, but both agree that it is vital.49 The democratic self-
governance theory postulates that a self-governing society cannot create 
                                                 
resolution of disagreement through simple discussion highly unlikely. And if the possibility of 
rational discourse and discovery is negated by these entrenched and irreconcilable perceptions 
of truth, the dominant “truth” discovered by the marketplace can result only from the triumph 
of power, rather than the triumph of reason. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
41. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 909–10 (2010). 
42. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 79 (1960) (“[T]he principle of the freedom 
of speech is derived, not from some supposed ‘Natural Right,’ but from the necessities of self-
government by universal suffrage . . . .”). 
43. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 
(1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 
(1991). 
44. Schauer, supra note 41, at 910.  
45. See generally Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the 
Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24–41 (2011) (outlining the role of the press in promoting First 
Amendment values). 
46. See Blasi, supra note 34, at 539 (“The check on government must come from the power of 
public opinion, which in turn rests on the power of the populace to retire officials at the polls, to withdraw 
the minimal cooperation required for effective governance, and ultimately to make a revolution.”).  
47. See Scanlon, supra note 43, at 214 (“[A] legitimate government is one whose authority 
citizens can recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents.”).  
48. See id. at 204–05.  
49. Ingber, supra note 40, at 9–12.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/5
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optimal social value for its citizens unless the citizens are well-informed and 
able to contribute robustly to national conversation and debate.50 The aim 
of democracy is for voters to make wise decisions—“[t]he voters, therefore, 
must be made as wise as possible.”51 The Supreme Court has often endorsed 
this theory, stating “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.”52 Thus, in the democratic 
self-governance theory of free expression the primary role of the press is to 
inform the citizenry53 because without an informed citizenry democratic 
decision-making will be less effective, and the government runs the risk of 
being tyrannized by the well informed.54  
The second theory of free expression, the individual autonomy theory, 
emphasizes that a legitimate democratic process must be open to the entire 
citizenry, and the government must not manipulate citizens’ decision-
making by suppressing speech or ideas. 55  A government cannot be 
legitimate unless it allows citizens to take part in governing as “equal, 
autonomous, rational agents.”56 The government cannot unduly restrict the 
free press under this theory because, in making political decisions, citizens 
“have a right to the information necessary to make informed choices and 
can claim this right against the government.”57 Without such information, a 
rational, autonomous agent should not submit to any governmental decree 
because it would be an act of coercion by the government without respecting 
an individual’s right to participate in the “collective decision making” of 
their community.58 The role of the press is to facilitate political discussion 
                                                 
50. Id. at 9. See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 788, 793 (Vincent Blasi ed., 2d 
ed. 2012). 
51. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 50, at 793. 
52. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). 
53. Cohen, supra note 45, at 24.  
54. Id. See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 n.36 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
In seeking out the news the press . . . acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by 
which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the 
press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment. 
Id. (quoting Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863–64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
55. Ingber, supra note 40, at 10; See also Strauss, supra note 43, at 355–56 (explaining that 
government suppression of speech impermissibly manipulates a citizen’s decision-making process).  
56. Scanlon, supra note 43, at 214. Succinctly, the premise of an autonomy theory of free 
expression is that an autonomous citizen has, and morally should have, the ability to decide whether to 
follow a governmental decree. A rational, autonomous citizen will only do so when the harm being 
prevented, such as the spreading of false information, outweighs the benefits of free expression. This 
theory states the government has the authority to place restrictions on free expression to the extent that 
the benefits outweigh the harm of free expression. Id. at 217–18. 
57. Id. at 222.  
58. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
964, 991–92 (1978) (explaining that “individual self-fulfillment and participation in change are 
fundamental purposes of the first amendment”).  
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between citizens, who are entitled to a free press to aid them in decision-
making, and the government, which must communicate with and be subject 
to its citizens to remain democratically legitimate.59 A free press makes self-
governance possible by serving as an intermediary between the government 
and autonomous citizens.60  
The main difference between these theories is that the democratic self-
governance theory asserts freedom of expression will lead to better 
informed decisions and therefore better consequences for the public good.61 
The individual autonomy theory, on the other hand, asserts that, whether or 
not free expression creates better outcomes, citizens must have the ability 
to express themselves freely in order for a government exercising control 
over those citizens to be considered legitimate. 62 Regardless of why the 
right to free expression arises, under both theories of free expression 63 
citizens must trust the press to serve its given role of informing the citizenry 
and facilitating a forum for communication between a legitimate 
government and its autonomous citizenry.  
Public trust that the press will inform and mediate public discussion is 
essential to a democratic society because a government is only legitimate if 
the press performs these functions and facilitates the popular participation 
in elections and the political process that is essential to sustaining our 
democracy.64  
B. How Fake News Is Undermining the Democratic Function of the Press 
Extending defamation liability often invokes fears that increased liability 
will chill speech by media outlets and is considered by many to be in 
inherent conflict with our constitutional commitment to freedom of the 
press.65 But the press cannot perform its essential functions, as outlined 
                                                 
59. Cf. Scanlon, supra note 43, at 222 (“[T]he authority of governments to restrict the liberty of 
citizens in order to prevent certain harms does not include authority to prevent these harms by controlling 
people’s sources of information to insure that they will maintain certain beliefs.”). 
60. Baker, supra note 8, at 343. 
61. See Ingber, supra note 40, at 10–11 (explaining the different values driving the social value 
and individual perspective on free expression).  
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. See Baker, supra note 8, at 332 (“An autonomous, moral agent ought to be self-governing. . . . 
For self-governance, a person must be able to participate in and be able to accept the mandates of the 
collective process.”). See also Ingber, supra note 40, at 11.  
65. See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 10, at 583 (“In recognition of the risks to non-defamatory 
speech posed by defamation liability, the Supreme Court has erected First Amendment-based hurdles to 
defamation claims. Those hurdles attempt to balance the need to afford redress to defamation victims 
against the need for robust social discourse, particularly that facilitated by a free press.”).  
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above, when a constant flow of fake news undermines media legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public.66  
The recent onslaught of fake news in the political arena, exemplified by 
the uptick of fake political news circulated online during the 2016 
presidential election, is just the most recent development in a string of 
changes in cultural norms undermining the ability of the press to perform 
its democratic functions.67 One commentator has suggested that fake news 
thrives on the tendency, building for decades, of the American public to let 
“the subjective entirely override the objective; thinking and acting as if 
opinions and feelings are just as true as facts.”68 This mentality may be 
traceable to the 1960s post-modernist intellectual era and has slowly 
expanded into the political sphere, culminating in political figures using the 
term “alternative facts” to undermine news reports portraying an 
administration in an unfavorable light.69  
This growing tendency to discount facts has created a market for fringe 
media outlets to manipulate opinions to look like objective truths and 
ultimately has created a public apathy among citizens as to whether their 
opinions are based in fact. 70  Combined with other factors, like the 
consolidation of media companies and the continued increase in the 
percentage of Americans getting their news through social media websites, 
such as Facebook, this disregard for objective truth has created an 
environment in which fake news thrives.71  
Legal scholars72 began discussing the effects of these cultural changes 
on the function of the First Amendment,73 particularly noting that millions 
of Americans held a variety of beliefs that were simply untrue,74 before fake 
                                                 
66. See Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 3, at 215 (noting that “[t]he declining trust in mainstream 
media could be both a cause and consequence of fake news gaining more traction.”).  
67. Anderson, supra note 2. 
68. Id.  
69. Id.  
70. Id. (stating that facts and opinions are interchangeable in the general public’s mindset 
because the average American believes “being American means we can believe anything we want; that 
our beliefs are equal or superior to anyone else’s, experts be damned”). See also Tavernise, supra note 
7 (explaining that experts believe fake news allows people to feel as though they are “[n]o longer 
burdened with wrestling with the possibility that they might be wrong,” creating a political atmosphere 
of hyperpolarization). 
71. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, 
Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 65 
(2017). 
72. See generally Horwitz, supra note 38, at 468 (chronicling recent works by First Amendment 
scholars addressing how the First Amendment should deal with false statements).  
73. Though legal scholars have been discussing these issues in relation to the internet and social 
media in particular, concerns about the increased spread of false information existed long before the 
recent anxiety surrounding fake news. Similar concerns were raised in the 20th century when both the 
radio and television became prominent news media. Allcott & Gentzkow, supra note 3, at 211.  
74. In 2010, Frederick Schuaer cited the beliefs that President Obama was born in Kenya, that 
President Bush knew about the 9/11 attacks before they happened, and that the Holocaust is a myth 
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news became a household phrase. First Amendment scholars have been 
grappling with whether there is a justification for protecting false statements, 
generally recognized as socially worthless, 75  at the point that “plainly, 
demonstrably, and factually false”76 claims of fact have “become cascades, 
gaining adherents at dramatically increased rates and distorting politics, 
public discussion, and public policy itself.” 77  These discussions have 
focused on how far false statements should be protected in order to avoid 
chilling socially useful contributions of the press and free expression.78 
Striking this balance is the key to creating an acceptable legal solution to 
the problem of fake news.  
While the intellectual irrationality that has led to fake news is not novel,79 
the specific threat fake news poses to the press’s ability to inform the public, 
critical to its role in a democratic society, has already had significant 
consequences. For example, a study completed shortly after the 2016 
presidential election found most Americans believe fake news articles 
caused a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of current events and 
issues.80 Another study conducted by Stanford researchers found that even 
technologically savvy teenagers were “easily duped” by misinformation on 
the internet.81 The authors of the study stated, “we worry that democracy is 
threatened by the ease at which disinformation about civic issues is allowed 
to spread and flourish.”82 Moreover, the teenage subject group demonstrated 
that allowing the spread of fake news to continue represents a threat to the 
ability of the next generation to participate in our democracy as an informed 
electorate.83  
The problem posed by fake news is not only that citizens believe false 
news stories, but also that they stop believing real news as well because they 
no longer trust the mainstream press.84 One commentator has noted, “Fake 
news, and the proliferation of raw opinion that passes for news, is creating 
                                                 
perpetuated by Zionists as examples of beliefs held by a substantial number of Americans that are 
demonstrably untrue. Schauer, supra note 41, at 897.  
75. Horwitz, supra note 38, at 468.  
76. Schauer, supra note 41, at 898. 
77. Horwitz, supra note 38, at 472 (footnotes omitted).  
78. See Schauer, supra note 41, at 899 (attempting to determine how to balance free speech 
doctrine with “what appears to be the increasing and unfortunate acceptance of factual falsity in public 
communication”). 
79. See Anderson, supra note 2 (stating that the ability to label “inconvenient journalism” as fake 
news and that statement being accepted by at least some portion of the public is possible “because now 
factual truth really is just one option”). 
80. See Barthel, Mitchell & Holcomb, supra note 4 (a survey conducted one month after the 2016 
election found that sixty-four percent of Americans believe fake news caused a great deal of confusion 
about the basic facts regarding current events and issues among the general public).  
81. STANFORD HISTORY EDUC. GRP., supra note 9, at 4.  
82. Id. at 5.  
83. Id.  
84. See Tavernise, supra note 7. 
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confusion, punching holes in what is true, causing a kind of fun-house effect 
that leaves the reader doubting everything, including real news.” 85  The 
public’s inability to trust information presented by the media threatens the 
continued viability of our representative democracy by causing citizens to 
vote irrationally and irresponsibly, as their political opinions become 
unmoored from facts,86 or lose trust in the electoral system completely.87 
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW DEFAMATION AND  
§ 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Having established the necessity of public trust in reliable and credible 
sources of news to sustain our democratic system,88 it is necessary to discuss 
how defamation law traditionally helped deter the publication of socially 
worthless false information. Understanding the role of defamation liability 
in discouraging the spread of false information is key to understanding how 
modern policy developments have prevented defamation litigation from 
inhibiting the spread of fake news. This section traces the history of 
common law defamation liability and its modified application to internet 
sources through § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.  
A. Common Law Defamation 
The tort of defamation serves to allow individuals to seek relief for 
injuries to their reputation caused by the spreading of false statements that 
tend “to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, 
contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation, or disgrace.” 89 
Historically, defamation allowed a plaintiff to protect his reputation by 
setting the record straight in a public forum, punished publishers of 
defamatory statements by imposing damages, and compensated a plaintiff 
for the injury caused to his “deserved” reputation.90  
                                                 
85. Id.  
86. The confusion about basic facts underlying current events and basic political issues leads 
voters to give into the “natural human tendency toward confirmation bias, whereby we selectively 
choose facts that support our pre-existing biases.” Gaughan, supra note 71, at 69. Reinforcing political 
polarization, citizens are voting based on a worldview that is uninformed about certain facts and political 
issues and misinformed regarding other political issues because they only read news confirming their 
pre-conceived notions of the issues. Id.  
87. See id. at 69–70 (explaining how a fake news story alleging 2016 presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign had committed election fraud reached more than six million people and 
created “baseless fears about the integrity of the election results”).  
88. See supra Part I.  
89. Ingber, supra note 25, at 797 (quoting Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 
218 (N.Y. 1933)).  
90. Id. at 791–92.  
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Defamation requires 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning 
another, 2) that is published without privilege to a third party, and 3) is 
actionable irrespective of special harm or is the legal cause of special 
harm.91 A statement is considered defamatory if it “tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or 
to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”92  
Defamation law imposes different standards of liability on authors and 
publishers versus distributors based on their ability to evaluate the 
truthfulness of a statement they published.93 Authors are subject to liability 
if they were negligent in failing to ascertain their statement’s falsity or 
defamatory character because they usually know or can find out whether a 
work they produced themselves contains a defamatory statement. 94 
Publishers, such as the news outlet that employs the journalist who authored 
a piece, are liable under the same negligence standard as authors because 
they also had the ability to easily find out whether they were publishing a 
defamatory statement. 95  Mediums that exercise editorial control over 
material are considered publishers and held to the negligence standard under 
common law defamation liability. 96  Distributors, who do not exercise 
editorial control over the content, are only liable for the defamatory material 
if they knew or had reason to know of its defamatory character.97  
B. The Supreme Court Constitutionally Limits Defamation 
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began 
imposing First Amendment restrictions on defamation suits.98 Tying the 
right to freedom of speech and press to the role of political discussion in 
sustaining our democracy, 99  the Court stated defamation laws allowing 
broad recovery “dampen[] the vigor and limit[] the variety of public 
debate.” 100  To accommodate the competing values of preventing self-
censorship and providing compensation for harms to an individual’s 
reputation, the Court distinguished between public officials, who 
                                                 
91. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
92. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 977). 
94. Id.  
95. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:92 (2d ed. 2018). 
96. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
98. 1 SMOLLA, supra note 95, § 1:17. 
99. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“The maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the 
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the 
Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”) (quoting Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
100. Id. at 279. 
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voluntarily inject themselves into public life and debate, and private figures, 
who have not voluntarily opened themselves up to scrutiny by the press.101 
To protect speech critical to political debate, the Court held that the 
Constitution requires a public official seeking damages for defamation to 
prove “actual malice”—meaning the author or publisher published material 
concerning public officials with “knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false.”102 Distributors are also held to 
the constitutional standard of actual malice.103 
C. Congress Implements § 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
It was against this backdrop of defamation law’s tension between 
protecting freedom of expression and providing compensation for injury to 
reputation that Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230, commonly known as the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA).104 Congress enacted the CDA as part 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the intent to overrule early 
cases regarding defamation liability for internet intermediaries—Cubby, Inc. 
v. CompuServe, Inc.105 and, more explicitly,106 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co.107  
In Cubby, the Southern District of New York considered whether an 
“electronic, for-profit library” that made a vast number of publications 
available to subscribers but exercised no editorial control over the content 
uploaded to their database was subject to publisher or distributor defamation 
liability.108 The court applied common law defamation liability and held that 
CompuServe was subject to only distributor liability and therefore had no 
duty to monitor every issue of every periodical on its database for 
defamatory content.109 
In Stratton, a New York trial court followed the logic of Cubby and found 
Prodigy, a provider of online bulletin boards on which members could post 
                                                 
101. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). See also 1 SMOLLA, supra note 95, § 
2:12 (explaining the modern approach to the distinctions between public figures and private individuals).  
102. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
103. The Second Restatement of Torts states “one who publishes” a defamatory statement 
regarding a public official must act with knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth 
without differentiating between publishers and distributors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
104. Freiwald, supra note 10, at 596–98 (explaining how courts’ failure to cost-effectively reduce 
defamation in interpreting the CDA does not optimally balance the interests of free speech and 
compensating injuries). 
105. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
106. Freiwald, supra note 10, at 596.  
107. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
108. 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
109. Id.  
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information,110 subject to a negligence standard as a publisher of defamatory 
information.111 Because Prodigy monitored the content posted to its bulletin 
boards for content it considered inappropriate,112 the court held that Prodigy 
was a publisher, not a distributor.113 The court concluded that “Prodigy’s 
conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up 
to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that 
make no such choice.”114 
Following the Stratton decision, internet intermediaries lobbied 
Congress to rectify the paradox created by these two cases: that internet 
companies who monitored the content posted to their websites would be 
held liable while those who provided no supervision would be subject to no 
liability, creating the perverse incentive for ISPs to forego monitoring 
content altogether.115 Congress acquiesced by passing the CDA with the 
specific intent of overruling the disincentives created by Stratton for 
websites 116  to monitor inappropriate material on their sites. 117  Congress 
erred on the side of imposing less liability on websites and ISPs, for the 
purpose of preserving “the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services.”118 
Rather than requiring interactive computer services to monitor their content, 
the CDA instead provides broad immunity for websites that do not exercise 
editorial control over the content posted on their platforms.119 CDA § 230 
states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
                                                 
110. 1995 WL 323710, at *1. 
111. Id. at *4. 
112. Id. at *2. 
113. Id. at *4. 
114. Id. at *5.  
115. Friewald, supra note 10, at 594.  
116. The CDA uses the non-intuitive terms “interactive computer service” and “information 
content provider” to differentiate between websites that exercise editorial control and those that provide 
only a platform for others to post content without monitoring that content at all. An “interactive computer 
service” is “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that 
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions” and denotes a platform that does not exercise editorial control over the content posted on 
the website. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2016). An “information content provider” is “any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2016). Interactive 
computer services are immune from publisher or speaker liability based on information posted to their  
website by another information content provider. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2016). 
117. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 
208 (“One of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any 
other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content 
that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”). See also Zeran v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that Congress enacted § 230 to remove 
disincentives for self-regulation created by Stratton).  
118. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2016).  
119. Friewald, supra note 10, at 595. 
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treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.” 120  These provisions of the CDA have 
modified the common law defamation framework as applied to ISPs and 
websites, granting web services broader protection from defamation 
liability than they would have under defamation law that still applies to print 
and television publications.121 
The courts have interpreted § 230 of the CDA to convey broad immunity 
to website administrators, regardless of whether they exercise editorial 
control over defamatory content posted on their platforms,122 a distinction 
that traditionally would have mattered under common law defamation.123 In 
Zeran v. American Online, one of the first cases interpreting § 230, the 
Fourth Circuit held that §230(c)(1) immunized interactive computer 
services from not only publisher liability but also distributor liability for 
defamatory material posted by third parties on their websites.124 The court 
broadly claimed that, “[b]y its plain language, § 230 creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable 
for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”125 The 
court reasoned that Congress intended § 230 to immunize both publishers 
and distributors because, while a distributor is indeed distinct from a 
publisher in determining the standard of liability, both can be considered a 
subset within the broader definition of publisher for defamation purposes.126 
All federal courts to consider the issue since Zeran’s seminal holding 
have followed—and, in some cases, even extended 127 —this precedent, 
refusing to hold websites that do not contribute to the development of 
content posted to their website liable for defamatory statements posted by 
third parties.128 In Blumenthal v. Drudge, the D.C. district court stated, 
                                                 
120. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2016). 
121. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31 (explaining that § 230 creates immunity from common law 
defamation categories for internet intermediaries). 
122. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
123. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *3–4 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
124. 129 F.3d at 328. 
125. Id. at 330. 
126. See id. at 332. 
Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to disseminate the . . . 
information gathered by others may also be regarded as participating to such an extent . . . as 
to be regarded as publishers. They are intentionally making the contents available to others, 
sometimes without knowing all of the contents—including the defamatory content—and 
sometimes without any opportunity to ascertain, in advance, that any defamatory matter was to 
be included in the matter published. 
Id. (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 803 (5th ed. 1984)) 
127. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125 (holding that even websites providing “pre-prepared 
responses” could not be held liable for defamatory statements because of the CDA). 
128. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 95, § 4:86 (summarizing holdings of Zeran’s progeny). But see 
Grace v. eBay Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 201 (Cal. Ct. App.), review granted and opinion superseded, 99 
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“[Congress] made the legislative judgment to effectively immunize 
providers of interactive computer services from civil liability in tort with 
respect to material disseminated by them but created by others.”129 Similarly, 
in Doe v. America Online, Inc., the Florida Supreme Court held that, 
although under traditional distributor liability the defendant would be liable 
for negligently failing to remove offensive material from its website,130 § 
230 pre-empted a state tort claim based on distributor liability because 
“distributor liability, or more precisely, liability for knowingly or 
negligently distributing defamatory material, is merely a species or type of 
liability for publishing defamatory material.”131  
Overall, courts have interpreted the § 230 immunity provision broadly 
and have refused to hold ISPs liable for any publication of defamatory 
material, regardless of any exercise of, or lack of, editorial control.132 This 
means courts are affording websites and ISPs the broadest immunity 
possible. Few courts have challenged this interpretation of the CDA, though 
in Doe v. GTE Corp. the Seventh Circuit questioned whether disclaiming 
all liability for ISPs achieves the goals of § 230, the title of which promises 
protection for “Good Samaritan” screening of offensive materials.133 The 
court correctly pointed out that because both websites and ISPs that screen 
for offensive material and those that refrain from screening are granted 
immunity, websites and ISPs can be expected to take the less expensive, 
non-screening route.134 Thus, an interpretation of § 230 that treats websites 
and ISPs exercising editorial control the same as those that do not defeats 
the original policy goals of the “Good Samaritan” law and likely serves few 
of the purposes Congress intended.135 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) (holding that § 230 does not explicitly address distributor liability and therefore does 
not preclude holding internet service providers liable for failing to take down defamatory material after 
receiving notice). 
129. 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998). 
130. 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 2001). 
131. Id. at 1016. 
132. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for 
the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.”); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (stating that the 
defendant website cannot be liable unless it created the defamatory content). 
133. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
134. Id.  
135. Id.  
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III. REFORMING § 230 TO COMBAT FAKE NEWS AND PROTECT 
LEGITIMACY OF THE PRESS 
The ramifications of the CDA’s immunity provisions are evident in the 
rise of fake news.136 The broad immunity from defamation afforded to web 
sites has created an environment in which “rumors, ‘counter-knowledge,’ 
misinformation, ‘post-truths,’ ‘alternative facts’ or just plain damned lies” 
are ubiquitous on social media sites and completely unchecked, as long as 
the web sites did not author the defamatory material in the first place.137 The 
problems caused by fake news could be solved, or at least substantially 
decreased, by amending the CDA to impose a modified version of common 
law distributor liability on ISPs and websites, which would ultimately hold 
social media websites accountable for fake news they know is posted on 
their platforms.138 
A. Defects in Current Law 
Those discussing possible solutions to curbing fake news have been 
pessimistic about finding a legal solution to the problem. 139  Legal 
commentators are reluctant to advocate extending defamation law in a 
meaningful way specifically for the purpose of addressing fake news due to 
the perceived negative effects such an extension would have on the interests 
of free expression.140 As discussed above, however, the effect of failing to 
regulate fake news could be even more harmful to First Amendment values 
than expanding defamation liability on the internet.141  
In certain circumstances, our current defamation law has been sufficient 
to hold authors of fake news liable, even under the heighted actual malice 
standard applied when a publication is commenting on public officials, 
because the authors know what they are writing is false or have conscious 
                                                 
136. See Klein & Wueller, supra note 9, at 7; Steven Seidenberg, Lies and Libel, ABA J., July 
2017, at 48, 52. 
137. Klein & Wueller, supra note 9, at 1.  
138. See infra Part III.B. 
139. See Seidenberg, supra note 136, at 54. 
140. See, e.g., Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer & Jane R. Baumbauer, Identifying and 
Countering Fake News 17 (Univ. of Ariz., Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
3007971 (“[L]egal solutions are likely to be over-inclusive and threaten flourishing, robust public debate 
on the Internet to a greater degree than fake news imperils it.”); All Things Considered: What Legal 
Recourse Do Victims of Fake News Stories Have?, NPR (Dec. 7, 2016, 7:04PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2016/12/07/504723649/what-legal-recourse-do-victims-of-fake-news-stories-have [hereinafter What 
Legal Recourse Do Victims of Fake News Stories Have?] (discussing the reluctance of media law and 
constitutional law thinkers to limit the ideals of the First Amendment and the marketplace of ideas and 
curb fake news).  
141. See supra Part I.B. 
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doubts that what they are writing is true. 142  For example, the yogurt 
company Chobani sued the right-wing radio host Alex Jones for defamation 
after Jones alleged on his website, radio show, and YouTube channel that 
the company’s employees, who were refugees, were connected to a sexual 
assault of a child. 143 Chobani’s founder maintained the publication was 
defamatory, and Jones ultimately retracted and apologized for the 
remarks.144 This demonstrates how defamation liability can and does restrict 
the spread of socially-worthless false information.145  
In many instances, however, targets of fake news are unable to bring 
defamation suits for various reasons.146 First, many authors of fake news are 
anonymous.147 Second, some authors of fake news live outside the United 
States and therefore are outside the jurisdiction of United States courts.148 
Finally, the incentive for victims to bring a defamation suit may be low 
because many authors, even if they are within the United States, have 
limited financial resources.149  
Social media websites, most prominently Facebook, spread fake news 
articles widely.150 Because of their reach, the fake news traffic on these sites 
has been the target of much concern in the fight against fake news.151 But 
because social media websites rarely, if ever, create or exercise editorial 
control over the content shared by users on their websites, they benefit from 
the complete immunity the CDA offers to internet distributors.152 The CDA 
                                                 
142. Seidenberg, supra note 136, at 52. “Courts also look at the inherent improbability of the 
[defamatory] statements” to establish reckless disregard for the truth in order to satisfy the actual malice 
standard. Id. (alteration in original). For particularly outrageous stories, like Pizzagate (see Gillian, supra 
note 5), even public officials could have a good chance at winning a defamation suit.  
143. Christine Hauser, Alex Jones Retracts Chobani Claims to Resolve Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (May 
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/alex-jones-chobani-lawsuit.html?mcubz=3. 
144. Id.  
145. Seidenberg, supra note 136, at 50.  
146. What Legal Recourse Do Victims of Fake News Stories Have?, supra note 140. 
147. All Things Considered: We Tracked Down a Fake-News Creator in the Suburbs. Here’s What 
We Learned, NPR (Nov. 23, 2016, 3:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/11/ 
23/503146770/npr-finds-the-head-of-a-covert-fake-news-operation-in-the-suburbs [hereinafter We 
Tracked Down a Fake-News Creator in the Suburbs].  
148. Seidenberg, supra note 136, at 52.  
149. What Legal Recourse Do Victims of Fake News Stories Have?, supra note 140. 
150. Silverman, supra note 6. 
151. See Gaughan, supra note 71, at 67–68.  
[Many] things made the influence of fake news in the 2016 election different and more 
dangerous than previous incarnations of politically-motivated misinformation and scurrilous 
allegations. First, fake news spread at an alarmingly fast rate in 2016. The 
internet’s democratization of the dissemination of information has facilitated the spread 
of fake news like never before. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
152. Timothy L. Alger, The Communications Decency Act: Making Sense of the Federal Immunity 
for Online Services, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Jan. 2017, at 30. 
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prevents social media websites from bearing any liability for defamatory, 
fake news posted to their websites.153  
B. Possible Reforms Aimed at Curbing the Proliferation of Fake News 
The conversation regarding the recent uptick and negative effects caused 
by the proliferation of fake news has included educational and corporate 
solutions to the problem. 154  For example, educational researchers have 
emphasized the need for digital literacy education for middle school and 
high school students.155 Major websites like Google and Facebook are also 
taking steps against fake news.156 Google, for example, is reported to be 
terminating advertising revenues to fake news sites and revising its search 
algorithms to place misleading information lower on results lists. 157 
Facebook has reportedly considered allowing users to flag news articles as 
fake and investigating articles tagged as such further by third-party fact 
checkers.158  
Due to the significant threat fake news poses to the functions of our free 
press and its role in our democracy, however, social solutions alone are 
insufficient. 159 Legal solutions are necessary to address and prevent the 
further spread of fake news. 160 One legal solution that would be highly 
effective in addressing the problem of fake news on social media websites 
is amending § 230 of the CDA.161 Congress should amend § 230’s broad 
immunity provision to hold interactive computer services—meaning social 
media websites allowing fake news—liable based on a common law 
defamation framework for distributor liability targeted specifically toward 
curbing fake news. Congress could structure the new distributor liability to 
target the problem of fake news by requiring, or strongly incentivizing, ISPs 
and websites, specifically social media websites, to provide a forum to 
submit complaints about fake news articles circulating on the platforms.162 
                                                 
153. See Bershidsky, supra note 12 (“Today, if the potentially libelous information was published 
on a platform like Facebook or Twitter, the platform won’t be liable for any damages.”). 
154. Seidenberg, supra note 136, at 55.  
155. See, e.g., STANFORD HISTORY EDUC. GRP., supra note 9, at 7. 
156. Nick Wingfield et al., Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake News Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google-will-ban-websites-that-host-fake-
news-from-using-its-ad-service.html. 
157. Seidenberg, supra note 136, at 55. 
158. Amber Jamieson & Olivia Solon, Facebook to Begin Flagging Fake News in Response to 
Mounting Criticism, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo 
gy/2016/dec/15/facebook-flag-fake-news-fact-check [https://perma.cc/P5AZ-98FW]. 
159. See supra Part I. 
160. See Bershidsky, supra note 12. 
161. Id.  
162. This solution is modeled on the notice and takedown procedures the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) currently incentivizes websites to adopt in order to monitor users posting 
material that infringes on copyrights. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DMCA NOTICE-AND-
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The new distributor liability could limit websites’ responsibility to monitor 
complaints to only postings linking to published articles to avoid imposing 
a duty to monitor comments posted by individual users.163 The websites 
would then have an obligation to check the veracity of the article, to the 
extent possible, and remove the article within a certain designated time 
frame if the information in the article appears to be falsified. 164  This 
structure would be similar to what Facebook has already proposed, but 
amending the CDA to allow distributor liability would hold these websites 
legally accountable for implementing protections against fake news.165 The 
threat of this liability would incentivize social media sites to take down fake 
news articles when they are informed an article is spouting defamatory 
material.  
While Congress has allowed the internet to grow up without the 
imposition of common law defamation liability on interactive computer 
services, like social media websites, imposing liability is not a radical 
idea.166 The decision to avoid imposing distributor liability on websites and 
ISPs that do not exercise editorial control over content was a mere policy 
choice, one that Congress could have easily decided the other way.167 Fake 
news is taking a toll on the ability of the press to function in its democratic 
role of distributing the information citizens need to act as an informed 
electorate. 168  Congress’s policy choice—made while the internet was 
nascent—needs amending now that the internet has come to play such a 
dominant role in how our society and the press function.  
                                                 
TAKEDOWN PROCESSES: LIST OF GOOD, BAD, AND SITUATIONAL PRACTICES 2 (2015), https:// 
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DMCA_Good_Bad_and_Situational_Practices_Docume
nt-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BF3-MTQF]. The DCMA incentivizes websites to set up notice and 
takedown procedures for instances of copyright infringement hosted on their networks by limiting 
copyright infringement liability for service providers who lack actual knowledge of the infringement, 
provided that the infringement was not “actively apparent,” and “respond[] expeditiously” to remove 
infringing content once made aware of its presence. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 
§ 512(c)(1), 112 Stat. 2863, 2879–81 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)). Congress 
could adopt a similar incentive structure by limiting distributor liability when websites provide adequate 
notice and takedown procedures. 
163. The legislation could include a definition of fake news set out in supra note 1 to avoid 
sweeping up individuals and even opinion writers such as bloggers in its scope.  
164. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 162, at 1–2. 
165. Jamieson & Solon, supra note 158.  
166. See, e.g., Bershidsky, supra note 12 (discussing amending the CDA to hold social media 
websites to a common law distributor liability standard); Jamieson & Solon, supra note 158 (explaining 
that Facebook will be implementing a user-reporting system to flag fake news and sending flagged 
articles to third-party fact checkers to verify information). 
167. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (describing Congress’s 
decision not to impose distributor liability on interactive computer services as a policy choice);  
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (describing Congress’s choice not to impose 
distributor liability on interactive computer services as a “legislative judgment” made “wisely or not”).  
168. See supra Part I.  
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Critics may argue that subjecting interactive computer services to 
common law defamation distributor liability this late in the day would lead 
to ruinous liability for some of the most profitable companies in our 
economy, 169 but these fears are overwrought. First, as discussed above, 
websites like Google and Facebook are already taking steps on their own to 
begin combatting the plague of fake news.170 Although these voluntary steps 
are encouraging, the threat that fake news poses to our democracy is 
significant enough that we should not rely exclusively on these companies 
self-monitoring their own efforts.171 
Second, websites and ISPs, such as YouTube, are already incentivized 
to engage in similar monitoring of potential copyright infringement.172 For 
ISPs to comply with the Department of Commerce’s best practices for 
monitoring copyright infringement, limiting their legal liability under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), websites must provide 
mechanisms to copyright holders and others to give takedown notices when 
copyright infringements are found on a given website.173 After receiving 
notice of a possible copyright infringement on their platform, ISPs are then 
required to respond “expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing 
activity.”174  
Common law distributor liability, which requires the distributor have 
knowledge as to the falsity of a published article, provides a similar notice 
and takedown method for defamatory material as is already required for 
copyrighted material under the DCMA.175 Requiring websites and ISPs to 
follow a takedown protocol after receiving notice that defamatory material 
was posted on their website or platform would not be any more onerous for 
websites than what is already required by copyright law. Thus, amending § 
230 provides a workable solution to the problems created by fake news, 
which are currently exacerbated by the spread of fake news on social media, 
because social media websites are already taking the first steps toward 
                                                 
169. See Todd Shields, Google and Facebook Fret over Anti-Prostitution Bill’s Fallout, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2017, 10:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-
15/google-and-facebook-fret-over-anti-prostitution-bill-s-fallout [https://perma.cc/4E35-V9PL] (noting 
technology companies’ opposition to an amendment to the CDA designed to stop prostitution advertising 
on social media websites). 
170. Wingfield, Isaac & Benner, supra note 156.  
171. Bershidsky, supra note 12. 
172. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 162.  
173. Id.  
174. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
175. Andrew Bolson, The Internet Has Grown Up, Why Hasn’t the Law? Reexamining Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act, INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Aug. 27, 2013), https:// 
iapp.org/news/a/the-internet-has-grown-up-why-hasnt-the-law-reexamining-section-230-of-the/ [https: 
//perma.cc/EY4T-J5DJ]. 
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monitoring their platforms for this content and have strong legal incentives 
to conduct similar monitoring in the copyright context. 
CONCLUSION 
Fake news poses such a significant threat to the legitimacy of our press, 
and thus the democratic legitimacy of our government, that Congress should 
create a legal solution to address this problem. Our democracy depends on 
the public’s ability to rely on the information presented to it by the press in 
order to engage in the political process, yet fake news is significantly 
undermining Americans’ trust in the press’s credibility. Congress could 
address these problems created by fake news by amending § 230 of the CDA 
to hold ISPs and social media websites liable under a modified common law 
distributor liability. This would incentivize websites to remove defamatory 
fake news once they are made aware of it. Fake news creates a serious 
enough threat to our democracy that it necessitates a legal solution, and 
amending the CDA provides a solution that would be both effective and 
workable. 
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